03. FVI Expert Breakfast

Topic: The time bomb in the control cabinet – Service life of safety components & obsolescence management.

Together with Sebastian Fink (INspares) and experts from the field, we highlighted a risk that goes unnoticed in many German factory halls. The key insights:

• Function ≠ Permissibility (The 20-year limit): Many safety components (e.g., safety PLCs, relays, converters with safety function) have a manufacturer-defined maximum "service life" (often 20 years, sometimes only 10). After this period, they must be replaced – even if the component functions perfectly technically. The Occupational Safety Ordinance and standards such as EN ISO 13849 leave little room for maneuver here.
• The master data blind flight: The core problem is not the replacement, but the knowledge. Most companies simply do not know which safety component is installed where and when its clock runs out (manufacture date vs. delivery date vs. commissioning date). Without clean asset data, risk assessment is impossible.
• Economic total loss due to "norm compliance": When an old system requires an update due to expired safety components, a simple replacement is often not enough (as parts are discontinued). This results in complete retrofits or control system modifications that quickly exceed the current value of the system, making it an economic total loss.
• Sustainability paradox: We want to use machines longer (sustainability), but rigid service life requirements force us to replace them. The only solution is active obsolescence management: Those who know early on what expires when can stock up on spare parts or budget planned retrofits, instead of being surprised by a shutdown.
• Liability shifts upwards: The issue affects not only the maintenance staff but also the management (operator responsibility). Without validated testing of the safety chain, insurance coverage is at risk in the event of damage or audits (TÜV, BG).

Classification: No data, no sovereignty

This scenario is proof of why we at Hahn PRO speak of the "sovereignty trap." Those who do not have their asset data under control become driven by manufacturer specifications and standards.

Here, ADAM positions itself as an essential tool for operational intelligence:

• From the "black hole" to the life record: It is not enough for the knowledge about installed components to be in the head of an electrician or in a paper folder. ADAM serves as a central instance to make these critical master data (installation date, component type) digital and searchable.
• Risk management instead of firefighting actions: Maintenance is clearly value protection here. With correct data in ADAM, maintenance transforms from a cost factor to a risk manager, proactively showing management impending million-dollar investments (forced shutdown).
• The basis for decisions: Only those who have data can decide: "Do we stock the spare part now for 10 years or plan the retrofit?" Without this transparency, management is blind. ADAM provides the light in the data jungle.

Conclusion: The discussion shows drastically: Master data maintenance is not a bureaucratic self-purpose, but active asset protection. Those who do not document today will pay tomorrow with the shutdown of the system.